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The Honorable David N. Cicilline 
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. 
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law 
Committee on the Judiciary 
U.S. House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
 
Dear Chairman Cicilline and Ranking Member Sensenbrenner: 
 
I am the James G. Dinan University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School and the Wharton School.  My principal area of teaching and research is 
antitrust law.  I am author of Antitrust Law (formerly with the late Phillip E. Areeda and 
the late Donald F. Turner), the most cited legal treatise on this subject.1  You have asked 
me several questions about the adequacy of existing antitrust policy to address competitive 
problems in digital markets.  For the record, for more than ten years I have not been paid 
for either consulting work or research support by any entity involved in these markets. 
 
 The goal of antitrust is to identify and sanction anticompetitive practices, which are 
those that harm consumers by reducing output unreasonably, leading to higher prices or 
reduced quality or innovation.  Antitrust is not a cure-all for political problems, patent 
problems, breach of contract, fraud, invasion of privacy or other violations of tort law, 
unless the practice in question also harms competition.  Nor is it well designed to pursue 
business firm bigness for its own sake.  Large firm size becomes an antitrust problem only 
when it impairs competition.  When is does so, however, the interests of consumers and 
business can diverge to the extent that businesses profit from both higher output, which 
generally benefits consumers; and higher price-cost margins, which typically reduce output 
and injure consumers.  An important benefit of this consumer-oriented approach to antitrust 
is that maximum output is also conducive to economic growth, which benefits everyone, 
including business and labor. 
 
 Your first two questions pertain to the adequacy of existing law addressing 
monopolistic conduct or anticompetitive transactions, including mergers in digital markets.  
 
1Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law (4th ed. 21 vols., 2014-
2020) (“Antitrust Law”) 
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It is important to distinguish the statutory text, which is very broad, from the narrower case 
law.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1, reaches every agreement that “restrains 
trade,” which encompasses all anticompetitive output reductions.  Section 2, 15 U.S.C. §2, 
reaches all acts that “monopolize” markets.  The Clayton Act’s substantive provisions are 
even broader, reaching tying, exclusive dealing, and mergers “where the effect may be 
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly” (15 U.S.C. §§14, 18).  If 
one simply looked at the language of these statutes, they would seem adequate for the task. 
 
 By contrast, federal judicial interpretation of these provisions is much narrower, for 
several reasons. One is the residue of a legitimate reaction against excessive antitrust 
enforcement in the 1970s and earlier, much of which occurred at consumers’ expense.  
However, since that time antitrust has shifted very far in the other direction.  Today the 
marginal antitrust decision is much more likely to reflect under- rather than 
overenforcement.  A second is the fact that many judges obtained any antitrust training 
they received a quarter century or more ago.  Since then, notable progress in theoretical 
and empirical economics has both improved our techniques of analysis and shown the need 
for greater enforcement, particularly in markets with a significant technological or digital 
component.  A third is a naivete about efficiencies, which assumes that they explain many 
more anticompetitive practices than they do in fact.2 Finally, a fourth is residue of a belief, 
once widespread, that markets tend naturally to self-correct, resulting in a bias against 
enforcement.  These same developments in economics indicate that this proposition is 
false, and that we have paid a heavy price for it in the form of lower output, unnecessarily 
high price-cost margins, and reduced innovation.  The amount of monopoly in the economy 
has been climbing at a worrisome rate, to its highest level in decades, as borne out by 
numerous studies employing a variety of methodologies.3  In any event, antitrust law is not 
living up to the potential that Congress envisioned. 
 
 In some areas the federal judiciary exhibits an anti-enforcement bias that can be 
quite damaging.  For example, the Supreme Court has been unreasonably harsh in defining 
the burden that plaintiffs must meet in rule of reason cases.  Under the rule of reason, a 
plaintiff’s obligation should be to provide evidence of power and a sufficiently suspicious 
restraint that it requires an explanation.  At that point the burden of proof should shift to 
the defendant.  Some decisions such as California Dental4 and American Express5 have 
 
2The view is a relic of Robert H. Bork’s belief that efficiencies resulting from antitrust practices 
are not capable of being proved, but that they are ubiquitous and that relatively small efficiency 
gains can offset large competitive harm.  None of these propositions has withstood analysis.  See 
Herbert Hovenkamp and Fiona M. Scott Morton, Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust 
Analysis, Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 2020 (forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3481388. 
3One example is Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, The Rise of Market Power and the 
Macroeconomic Implications, Q. J. Econ. (forthcoming 2020) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 23687, 2017) https://www.nber.org/papers/w23687.pdf.  On the policy 
relationship between concentration and high margins, see Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, 
Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 Yale L.J. 1996 (2018). 
4 California Dental Assn. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
5 Ohio v. American Express, 138 S.Ct. 2280 (2018). 
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required plaintiffs to prove far too much at the beginning. The result is that the rule of 
reason has lost much of its usefulness as an enforcement tool.  As another example, the 
Supreme Court has been unnecessarily harsh on class actions, and more particularly on 
enforcement of arbitration agreements.  The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 et seq., 
was intended to provide a different, less cumbersome forum, not to take away rights that 
the law grants.  While legislative reform of the rule of reason is complex, the arbitration 
problem is not: Congress should make clear that if an arbitration agreement purports to 
take away a particular right, a private plaintiff is free to assert that right in court.  For 
example, if an arbitration agreement precludes class actions, an affected class of plaintiffs 
should be free to go to court.6 
 
 Your first substantive question concerns the adequacy of the existing law of 
monopolistic conduct, which refers to exclusionary practices by firms with substantial 
market power.  The answer here is that more could be done.  Antitrust experts are becoming 
more sophisticated in their assessment of market power, which is the power of firms to 
profit by increasing prices above cost.  Prior to the rise of modern econometric techniques, 
antitrust courts almost always estimated market power “indirectly,” as an inference from a 
firm’s share of a relevant market.  This method is still in widespread use even though 
superior methodologies have become available.  Market definition approaches in digital 
markets can be particularly prone to error because the products are often significantly 
differentiated.  For example, to state that “Google and Facebook control 70% of digital 
advertising”7 tells us little unless we know the extent to which digital advertising competes 
with more traditional advertising media. On the other hand, if we include traditional 
advertising in the market, we treat the two forms as perfect competitors, which understates 
market power. Market definition is necessarily binary: something is either inside or outside 
the market. In general, market definitions that include differentiated products will 
understate market power. This is particularly unfortunate because most antitrust activity in 
high tech markets involves differentiated products. 
 
Today we have developed econometric techniques that can address this market 
power question more accurately, without the need for a market definition.8  One historic 
limitation on the use of these techniques was the availability of sales data, but in digital 
marketplaces these data are comprehensive.  Another roadblock is the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion in its 2019 American Express decision that a relevant market must be defined 
in cases involving vertical relationships.9  In any event, the AmEx decision is purely 
statutory and within Congressional power to amend.  Any statutory reform for dealing with 
 
6See, e.g., American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013), which enforced an 
arbitration provision precluding class actions, with the result that injured parties could not 
maintain a class action at all.  A better interpretation would be that the arbitration agreement 
simply does not apply to forms of action that it excludes, thus leaving affected plaintiffs an 
opportunity to bring their class action in Federal District Court. 
7E.g., https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/02/facebook-and-googles-ad-dominance-is-showing-more-
cracks.html (Aug. 2019). 
8For an introduction see 2B Antitrust Law ¶¶520, 521 and current Supp. 
9Ohio v. American Express Co. (AmEx), 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). Techniques have been 
developed to get around the problem.  See Antitrust Law ¶520e (2020 Supp.). 
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internet commerce should make clear that market power for antitrust purposes should be 
measured by the best available technique for the situation, and it should avoid the error of 
continuously expressing market power in terms of a market share of a relevant market.10  
Courts cannot always avoid traditional market definition approaches, but when they can 
direct measurement will provide a better solution. 
 
Based on public information, it seems unlikely that the existing platforms have 
sufficient market power to be considered “monopolists” in most of the product markets 
where they operate.  One possible exception is Amazon’s very large proportion of the 
eBook market.  However, eBooks constitute approximately 20% of all book sales, so this 
question confronts the market definition issue discussed above.11  Another problematic area 
is internet advertising, where market share numbers are likely to be unreliable and power 
is better estimated directly from econometric evidence.  In fact, internet advertising enjoys 
some distinct advantages in cost and reach, making the exercise of market power more 
likely.  In any event, the market power of the large platforms is very likely sufficient for 
offenses such as exclusive dealing, most-favored-nation agreements, or tying. 
 
 The monopolization offense also requires proof of anticompetitive conduct. 
Exclusionary contract practices such as exclusive dealing can be anticompetitive even if 
the defendant is less than a monopolist.12  While predatory or other forms of exclusionary 
pricing is possible, the case for predatory pricing claims against individual internet sellers 
seems weak.  First, digital platforms are “two sided” markets, which means that revenue 
must be measured by looking at all relevant sides.  For example, while Google and 
Facebook are largely free to users they are almost certainly not engaged in predatory 
pricing.  Most of their revenue comes from advertising.  There have been allegations that 
Amazon once engaged in predatory pricing of ebooks, but those claims were found by both 
the Justice Department and the court to be unpersuasive, and I do not quarrel with that 
outcome.13   Agency investigations of the major platforms currently underway may uncover 
additional instances of anticompetitive pricing, but I am presently unaware of any. 
 
The other unilateral monopolistic practice that warrants attention is the unilateral 
refusal to deal, mainly with rivals.  United States antitrust law on unilateral refusals is less 
interventionist than that of the European Union and other jurisdictions.  A more aggressive 
 
10 Another serious error, also emanating from the AmEx decision, is to require that factual 
questions about market competition should be decided “as a matter of law,” thus placing them 
outside the reach of fact finding.  See, e.g., United States v. Sabre Corp., 2020 WL 1855433 
(D.Del Apr. 7 2020), which relied on AmEx to hold, as a matter of law, that a two sided market 
and a more traditional market cannot compete with one another.   Thousands of traditional taxicab 
companies and drivers who have been injured by Uber, Inc., would be surprised to hear that Uber 
and taxicabs cannot be competitors. 
11Given that ebooks and traditional books use very different production technologies and that the 
marginal cost of ebooks is low, ebooks very likely enjoy significant market power 
notwithstanding their competition with traditional books. 
12 See 3B Antitrust Law ¶¶767-768. 
13See United States v. Apple, 889 F. Supp.2d 623, 641-642 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (approving consent 
decree and rejecting objections that Amazon had been engaged in predatory pricing). 
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but cautious position would be conducive to increased competitiveness and economic 
growth. An overly broad duty-to-deal rule can make firms slow to invest their own 
resources in new markets, given that they have an entitlement to free ride on the established 
assets of other firms.  However, an overly conservative approach can weaken both price 
competition and innovation if it permits dominant firms to renege on commitments that 
involve significant collaborative development.  The harm must accrue not merely to the 
targeted firm but to the market as a whole.  In sum, refusal to deal rules should be designed 
to encourage entrepreneurial collaboration by protecting a firm’s investment, but to 
discourage free riding on the investments of others.  The district court’s opinion in the 
Qualcomm case, currently being litigated in the Ninth Circuit, provides a reasoned example 
of this approach.14 
 
 I see little merit in various proposals to break up large digital platforms such as 
Amazon or Facebook.  These proposals appear to see size itself as the wrong to be 
proscribed and offer little assurance that price or output will improve.  The opposite is more 
likely. The United States does not have a good track record with enforced breakups for 
monopolistic practices.15  Aside from recent mergers, there is no obvious way to break up 
highly integrated digital platforms without doing serious harm to both consumers and 
investors.  Breaking off individual features simply makes the platform less attractive to 
users but does little to alleviate monopoly.  Any breakup that interferes with economies of 
scale will result in higher costs and very likely higher prices or decreased product quality.  
In any event, a breakup proposal must be more than rhetorical flourish.  It must be 
accompanied by specifics showing which assets are to be spun off, as well as well-informed 
predictions concerning  the impact on output, price, or quality. 
 
 Also highly problematic is one popular “quasi” breakup proposal, which is that 
Amazon be required to establish separate platforms for sales of its own products and the 
numerous sales it makes as a broker for other merchants.16  The principal victims will be 
consumers, and the principal beneficiaries will be other large businesses whose products 
Amazon currently sells.  For example, the AmazonBasics house brand of consumer 
batteries currently competes on the Amazon website with Duracell (owned by Berkshire 
Hathaway), as well as brands such as Ray-O-Vac, Energizer and Delco, all owned by large 
firms.  AmazonBasics small appliances are sold in competition with Black and Decker, 
 
14FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F.Supp.3d 658 (N.D.Cal. 2019), app. docketed and stay granted, 
935 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2019).  On the rationales for refusal-to-deal rules in such cases, see Herbert 
Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, Cornell L. Rev. (2020) (forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3420925. 
15See William Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the 
Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 1105 (1989).   One exception is 
United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. 
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (consent decree breaking up AT&T). 
16 A version of this proposal, which has been widely circulated, was offered by former 
Presidential candidate Senator Elizabeth Warren. See https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-
how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c.  It is critiqued in Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics, ___ Boston Univ. L. Rev. (2020), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3508832. 
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America’s largest manufacturer of small appliances.  AmazonBasics luggage is sold in 
competition with Samsonite, the world’s largest luggage manufacturer.  AmazonBasics 
sticky notes and other consumable office supplies are sold in competition with 3M, also a 
very large firm.  One can go on with this list, but the point should be clear.  The impact of 
Amazon’s house brand competition in close juxtaposition with third parties is to force 
down the prices of the large name brands, most of which enjoy significant trademark appeal 
and high margins.  Segregating Amazon’s house brands from the name brands (or requiring 
Amazon to withdraw from the market of one or the other), will reduce price pressure on 
the name brands, enabling yet higher prices.  Consumers will be harmed and small 
businesses are unlikely to be benefitted. Wise antitrust enforcement requires figuring out 
who is being hurt, and how, before proceeding. 
 
 Your second question pertains to contract practices.  Here, antitrust has good but 
underutilized tools.  Currently the enforcement agencies are investigating several large 
platforms for possible anticompetitive abuses.  I am not privy to those investigations, other 
than what has been made public.  But antitrust policy should be brought to bear on such 
contract practices as most-favored-nation clauses (MFNs),17 anti-steering clauses,18 
exclusive dealing and related practices, including tying.  While these offenses require a 
showing of market power, the power requirements should not be as strong in networked 
markets as they are in more traditional industries.  Interconnection tends to magnify market 
distortions and collaborative networks are far more dependent on inter-firm cooperation 
than are more traditional markets.  On the other side, while there is always a fear of price 
fixing, the number and diversity of participants generally weakens our concern. 
 
 Antitrust condemnation of these contract practices should not ordinarily lead to 
divestiture or other structural remedies.  In most cases a prohibitory injunction plus 
disgorgement of unlawfully obtained gains is sufficient. I do believe that disgorgement 
should be broadly preserved as a remedy under an Agency’s general equitable power.19  A 
simple cease-and-desist order is rarely sufficient deterrence, because the remedy permits 
the firm to retain its unlawful gains.  It is like ordering the serial shoplifter to stop, but 
without return of previously stolen merchandise.  Shoplifting will be profitable.  This is a 
statutory issue and Congress should ensure that the agencies’ equitable powers include the 
authority to obtain disgorgement or analogous recoveries such as fines. 
 
 I do caution against too simplistic a view of the impact of large platform contract 
practices on affected groups, particularly small business and consumers.  For example, 
 
17An MFN clause requires one firm to give (or receive) as-good-as or preferential treatment over 
similarly situated rivals. 
18 An anti-steering clause forbids a reseller from shifting customers from one product, service, or 
form of payment to another which might be mutually advantageous for both the customer and the 
merchant. 
19See FTC v. Credit Bureau center, LLC, 937 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2019) (denying disgorgement 
relief), overruling FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1989).  See Judge 
Wood’s dissent from the denial of rehearing, noting the conflict in the Circuits.  In any event, the 
majority’s decision seems inconsistent with California vs. American stores, 495 U.S. 471 (1990) 
(general equitable powers included the right to seek divestiture). 
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while some small businesses who compete with Amazon are undoubtedly harmed, many 
others are benefitted because Amazon has effectively become their internet broker.  They 
receive access to internet distribution tools including billing and collection that they could 
not match on their own.  As a result, one should not act too categorically.  There is no good 
substitute for factual determinations of harms from contract practices. Specific instances 
of anticompetitive practices such as MFNs or exclusive dealing should be identified and 
remedied by both injunctive relief and private treble damages actions in appropriate cases. 
 
By the same token, given a nominal retail price that is often zero, the presumption 
is strong that consumers are benefitted by the major platforms.  But that issue needs to be 
taken apart and evaluated.  For example, tying that injures rivals, such as bundling free 
services to costly advertising or collateral services, can harm competition notwithstanding 
a nominal price of zero. Such situations also require close individual analysis, not 
categorical treatment. 
 
One important issue that may require attention, depending on the outcome of 
pending litigation, is anticompetitive reneging on FRAND licensing commitments.  Many 
substantial networks, including telecommunications, video technologies, and autonomous 
vehicles, are the product of collaborative innovation.  These networks require both 
technological compatibility and interconnection.  Participants agree voluntarily to license 
their patents to others at Fair, Reasonable, and Nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms.  The 
process has been well known in the law and economics literature for decades: firms bid for 
the right to be included at a time when the market for alternatives is competitive.  Later, 
when technological choices have become more limited, they are held to their promise to 
license on terms set by competition.20 Technological progress and delivery in these areas 
depend on firms’ ability to invest and develop, confident that they will obtain the patent 
rights they need at a competitive price. 
 
FRAND commitments are contractual, and breach of a contract neither entails nor 
precludes an antitrust violation.21  When market power and anticompetitive effects are 
present, however, practices such as selective refusals to license, tying, loyalty 
requirements, or exclusive dealing that involve FRAND patents undermine this 
competitive system and can violate the antitrust laws.  Judge Koh found as much in her 
Qualcomm decision.22 If Qualcomm’s conduct is approved other firms will do the same 
thing, as is apparently occurring in Europe,23 and the FRAND system will fall apart. One 
thing Congress should consider is legislation to protect the FRAND process, which has 
produced very considerable innovation in a competitive environment. I do not subscribe to 
the view that protecting one firm’s dominance will facilitate either national security or 5G 
 
20E.g., Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & Econ. 55 (1968). 
21Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, supra. 
22FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F.Supp.3d 658 (N.D.Cal. 2019), app. docketed and stay granted, 
935 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2019). 
23 See https://theconversation.com/car-wars-how-nokia-could-find-itself-at-centre-of-eu-
investigation-over-technology-patents-129643 (on Nokia and FRAND patents for autonomous 
vehicles).  
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development. Competitive markets that encourage competitive innovation and production 
are far more conducive to technological progress as well as higher output. Many of 
Qualcomm’s actions, such as pressuring Apple to stop dealing with Intel in this area, are 
nothing less than socially costly restraints on innovation. 
 
The problem of anticompetitive mergers also needs attention.  The language of §7 
of the Clayton Act is extremely broad, prohibiting all mergers whose “effect may be 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”  15 U.S.C. §18.  The 
statutory language does not distinguish among horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate 
mergers.  Nor does it require any particular measure of industrial concentration.  Empirical 
studies have repeatedly shown, however, that too many approved mergers result in 
competitive harm, mainly increased prices.24  Merger policy should not be designed to go 
after large size for its own sake.  It needs to rest on sound economic theory about when 
mergers lead to lower output and higher prices.  These tests should be objective and not 
depend on the testimony of affected firms.  Efficiency claims, which are frequently asserted 
in litigation, should be disregarded except where proof is particularly strong and non-
speculative, and then only as a tie-breaker for mergers that are barely above acceptable 
concentration thresholds.25  Merger law should also reflect sound economic analysis about 
bargaining behavior among profit-maximizing firms that often serves to explain why both 
horizontal and vertical mergers lead to higher prices.  The draft Vertical Merger Guidelines 
recently released by the Agencies are a good first step.26 
 
One pressing merger threat is widespread digital platform acquisitions of much 
smaller firms.27  Many of these acquisitions do not fit into the framework that the antitrust 
Agencies apply and that I support as a general matter.28  First, the acquisitions of 
competitors typically involve firms that are too small to trigger scrutiny under existing law.  
Many troublesome acquisitions involve complementary products, such as when a platform 
acquires a technology that improves its messaging abilities or augments its product line.  
In general, adding complementary products or services is competitively beneficial.  Such 
acquisitions can limit potential competition, however.  While the enforcement agencies 
challenged potential competition mergers in the 1960s,29 enforcement excesses of those 
years moved the Agencies to all but abandon the field.  The two sets of recent merger 
 
24 E.g., John Kwoka, Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies (2014). 
25Cf. New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2020 WL635499 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) 
(approving merger between Sprint and T-Mobile cellular carriers after applying a lax standard for 
proof of efficiencies in a highly concentrated market). 
26 See U.S.DOJ and FTC, Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines (released Jan. 10, 2020), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1561715/p810034verticalmergerg
uidelinesdraft.pdf. 
27Wikipedia maintains useful tables of firms acquired by the major platforms.  These can be 
sorted by date, size of acquisition, area of activity, and the like.  E.g., “Wikipedia List of 
Acquisitions by [Facebook] (or by Google, Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, etc.). 
28See Antitrust Law, Chs. 9 (horizontal mergers) & 10 (vertical mergers). 
29 E.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (disapproving cleanser company’s 
acquisition of bleach producer). 
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guidelines for horizontal (2010) and vertical (draft, 2020) mergers do not address them at 
any length. 
 
The threat to potential competition posed by these acquisitions is their elimination 
of nascent entrants.  The current tech giants all started out in someone’s garage, so to speak.  
Newcomers with promising technology may turn into platform giants themselves.  
Acquisitions became a way of removing these threats by preventing the emergence of new 
large rivals.  This is critical because one good solution to the problem of platform 
dominance is a larger number of platform competitors. 
 
Predicting which nascent firms will grow into substantial rivals is difficult, and 
merger law has historically required transaction specific proof.  Nevertheless, prediction 
of future effects is the essence of merger law.  Analyzing platform acquisitions will require 
more categorical treatment of a class of practices, as antitrust currently does with its per se 
rule. One promising solution would be to prohibit such acquisitions broadly, but permit 
dominant firms to obtain nonexclusive rights in acquired technology.  To illustrate, if 
Facebook wishes to acquire WhatsApp in order to improve its messaging services it would 
be able to purchase only a nonexclusive right to WhatsApp’s technology.30  Such a right 
would give Facebook all it needs to take advantage of WhatsApp’s product, but it would 
not prevent WhatsApp from further development or licensing its technology to others.  One 
objection to this proposal is that it reduces WhatsApp’s acquisition value.  Factually that 
is true.  From Facebook’s perspective, WhatsApp has value as both an integration asset 
and an exclusion asset.  This rule would say in effect that Facebook is entitled to purchase 
the integration but not the exclusion.31 
 
 Your third question concerns the institutional structure of antitrust enforcement.  
Funding for the antitrust enforcement agencies has not kept up with economic growth. 
Public enforcement is down even as the rate of supracompetitive returns is up. To some 
extent state antitrust enforcers attempt to pick up this slack, but this approach is inadequate 
for digital platforms that operate in virtually every state.  One historical purpose of federal 
antitrust law was to provide a nationwide jurisdiction that could achieve national 
uniformity. Further, the Agencies should have the authority to seek disgorgement of 
unlawful gains where appropriate, and particularly in areas where underenforcement is 
chronic or private enforcement inadequate. 
 
 As to the existence of separate agencies with overlapping but distinctive authorities, 
I think it important that the two Agencies be maintained. Only the Department of Justice 
 
30This acquisition actually occurred in 2014.  See 
https://money.cnn.com/2014/02/19/technology/social/facebook-whatsapp/index.html.  On 
nonexclusive licensing as a partial solution, see Kevin Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Startup 
Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust Policy, 87 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 331 (2020). 
31 The rule might also diminish the value to sellers, although that is not entirely clear.  On the one 
hand, WhatsApp would command a lower price if it could give Facebook only a nonexclusive 
license.  On the other, it could retain full residual rights to its company and its technology.  In any 
event, patents are clearly “assets” covered by §7’s condemnation of anticompetitive asset 
acquisitions.  See 5 Antitrust Law ¶1202f. 
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has the authority to pursue criminal charges, which are an essential part of federal antitrust 
policy.  By contrast, as an administrative agency the FTC can enforce antitrust policy 
without using the more cumbersome machinery of Article III courts.  For complex 
noncriminal matters this is particularly valuable.  Further, the leadership structure of the 
FTC gives it greater political stability than the Antitrust Division.  The Head of the 
Antitrust Division changes with every new President, and enforcement ideology can 
change suddenly, as it did between the Bush and Obama administrations, and again 
between the Obama and Trump administrations.  By contrast, the five Commissioners of 
the FTC have fixed and staggered terms and turnover cannot be accomplished so readily. 
 
 Under current law both Agencies have authority to enforce the Clayton Act, which 
means mainly that there is divided jurisdiction over mergers, a problem that the Agencies 
solve adequately by agreement among themselves. While the FTC does not have direct 
authority to enforce the Sherman Act, §5 of the FTC Act covers everything that the 
Sherman Act covers, plus some additional practices.  The potential of this somewhat 
ambiguous power has never been fully realized.  Because §5 of the FTC Act contains no 
agreement requirement it could be used to reach collusion-like activity without the need to 
prove a Sherman §1 “contract, combination, or conspiracy.”  Collusion-like behavior in the 
absence of a legally recognizable agreement is one of the most formidable problems that 
antitrust must confront.32  Here the FTC could be helpful in promulgating rules or 
Guidelines to identify and enjoin specific practices that tend to facilitate collusion but that 
do not have significant and provable social benefits.  Given the wariness of the courts to 
follow along in these efforts,33 this may require clarifying legislation.  One possibility is 
language amending §5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §45, to reach both unilateral and 
multilateral conduct that “restrains trade unreasonably” and authorize rule making 
accordingly. 
 
 Section 5 enforcement is also valuable in those areas where private enforcement 
might be deemed excessive or unwise.  Unlike the antitrust laws, §5 cannot be enforced by 
private parties.  This can be valuable for enforcement in areas where private enforcement 
may threaten overdeterrence or excessive litigation. 
 
 While the two Agencies generally co-exist quite well, there have been exceptions, 
but these hardly call for merging the two Agencies.  For example, the FTC continued to 
enforce the Robinson-Patman Act long after the Justice Department abandoned those 
efforts four decades ago.34  Currently, the Agencies are far apart on issues relating to 
collaborative innovation and standard essential patents, and are even litigating against one 
another in one high profile case.35 
 
32 The courts have been quite candid about the problem.  See Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De 
Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2017), observing that in concentrated markets firms 
can readily achieve cartel like results without a Sherman Act “agreement.” 
33 E.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (overturning FTC’s 
condemnation of parallel facilitating practices). 
34See DOJ, Report on the Robinson-Patman Act (1977). 
35See FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 935 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2019) (staying remedy in FTC Case against 
Qualcomm at request of Justice Department). 
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In the case of the Robinson-Patman Act, the Justice Department was correct to 
terminate public enforcement actions when it did.  By contrast, in the current dispute over 
standard essential patents the FTC is correct.  Here, the two Agencies seem to be guided 
by two very different models of innovation.  The FTC enforcement efforts are based on a 
model of collaborative innovation that has become critical to the development of 
information technologies in networked markets.  Such markets are characterized by a great 
proliferation of patents of mixed quality, the need for interoperability, and enforceable 
agreements to guide innovation and dissemination of technology.  By contrast, the Justice 
Department model seems to be more focused on individual entrepreneurs, patent centrality, 
and some apparent suspicion of collaboration.  In significant part these differences in 
perspective reflect differences in the nature of innovation and patents in different 
industries. 
 
This is an area that may need Congressional attention, depending in part on the 
outcome of the Qualcomm litigation.  If one participant in FRAND is allowed to unravel 
the system with impunity, others will quickly follow.  A model of collaborative innovation 
that has proven successful in information technologies will fall apart.  If that happens the 
United States could lose a significant portion of its technological edge in an area that has 
experienced rapid economic growth.  Enforcement here must also recognize that FRAND-
encumbered patents are distinctive.  While the patent system itself is technically unitary, 
encompassing all types of technology, FRAND has emerged in areas that are dominated 
by information technologies, networking and collaborative innovation.  As a result, more 
aggressive enforcement in one area need not affect the other area. 
 
Thank you for the opportunity to offer my thoughts.  If I can be of further assistance, 
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